Being is Meaning: Individual vs Collective

Another classic opposition in philosophy and the social sciences is the tension between individual and collective. Are meanings and realities grounded in the consciousness of individuals, or in the dynamics of social groups?

Some traditions treat the individual as primary, with society emerging from the aggregation of personal meanings. Others reverse the priority, arguing that collectives shape and constrain individual thought. But what if this polarity itself is misconstrued?

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The old divide

• Individualism: meaning and knowledge originate in the singular subject; society is a secondary arrangement.

• Collectivism: meaning and knowledge originate in the social whole; individuals are its products.

Each side struggles to explain the other: how can collective order emerge from isolated minds? Or how can minds exist without the shaping power of society?

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The relational shift

If being is meaning, then both “individual” and “collective” are cuts within the same field of construal.

• The individual is a construal of differentiation — meaning oriented through a singular perspective.

• The collective is a construal of integration — meaning oriented through alignment across perspectives.

Neither is ontologically prior. Individuation itself is a perspectival cline within the potential of collective construal.

So:

• Ontology = the systemic potential of meaning-being, within which both individuated and collective construals are possible.

• Epistemology = the reflexive phasing of construals that produce individuated and collective orientations.

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Why this matters

The individual/collective opposition depends on imagining meaning as either “inside” subjects or “outside” in society. But once being is understood as meaning, both poles are recognised as perspectives within the same symbolic field.

Individuals are not self-contained origin points, nor are collectives external forces. They are co-constituted phases of construal, differentiated and integrated together.

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The pay-off

Individualism mistakes the construal of differentiation for the ground of meaning.

Collectivism mistakes the construal of integration for the ground of meaning.

Both fall into ontological fallacy by absolutising one orientation of construal.

In a universe where being is meaning, individual and collective are not rival foundations. They are mutually dependent phases in the reflexive unfolding of meaning — perspectives cut from the same systemic potential.

Being is Meaning: Subject vs Object

Few distinctions seem more basic than that between subject and object: the knower and the known, the mind and the world, the “I” who perceives and the “thing” perceived.

Modern philosophy has often treated this split as fundamental — whether by centring the subject (as in Descartes), or by centering the object (as in scientific realism). But what if the split itself is not primitive?

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The old divide

• Subject: the active centre of awareness, consciousness, or agency.

• Object: the passive thing encountered, extended in space and time.

Knowledge is cast as a relation between these two poles: the subject represents, the object resists. The result is an endless struggle — how can the mind grasp the world, and how can the world be more than our projection?

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The relational shift

If being is meaning, then both subject and object are cuts within the same field of construal.

• The subject is a construal of perspective, the locus of “for-whom” meaning unfolds.

• The object is a construal of orientation, the locus of “what” is meant.

Neither is primordial. Both are perspectival effects, phase-shifts within the reflexive unfolding of meaning-being.

So:

• Ontology = the systemic potential for such perspectival construals.

• Epistemology = the actual phasing of construal into subject-orientations and object-orientations.

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Why this matters

The subject/object distinction feels absolute only if we think of being as split from knowing. But once being is understood as meaning, subject and object are no longer ontological primitives — they are roles generated within construal itself.

This dissolves the old epistemological anxiety: we do not need to explain how subjects can access objects across a gulf, because no gulf exists. The two emerge together as complementary orientations of the same process.

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The pay-off

Subject–object dualism mistakes perspectival construal for an ontological structure.

• Realist objectivism absolutises the object.

• Subjectivist idealism absolutises the subject.

Both freeze one pole of a dynamic relation and reify it as the ground of reality.

In a universe where being is meaning, subject and object are not fundamental kinds but reflexive cuts. They are how construal phases, not what reality is.

Being is Meaning: Materialism vs Idealism

Philosophy has often swung between two great poles: materialism, which claims that matter is fundamental, and idealism, which claims that mind or ideas are primary.

For materialists, the world is built from physical stuff, and thought is a late-arriving by-product. For idealists, reality is grounded in consciousness or spirit, with matter derivative or illusory.

It seems an absolute choice: base or superstructure, matter or mind, atoms or ideas. Yet the polarity only makes sense if we accept a prior split between being and meaning.

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The old divide

Materialism reduces meaning to matter: language, thought, and culture are nothing but patterns in physical substrates.

Idealism reduces matter to meaning: physicality is the unfolding of a deeper consciousness or Idea.

Both reduce one pole to the other, because both assume there must be some primitive substrate “beneath” reality — either mute matter or disembodied mind.

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The relational shift

If being is meaning, then neither matter nor mind stands as ground. Both are symbolic orientations within construal.

• Material is not mute stuff but a construal of persistence, density, extension.

• Ideal is not pure spirit but a construal of abstraction, reflexivity, possibility.

Ontology here is not about choosing which “substance” lies at the base, but recognising that both “matter” and “mind” are construed perspectives cut from the same potential.

So:

• Ontology = the structured potential of meaning-being that affords both material and ideal construals.

• Epistemology = the reflexive construal that phases between these orientations, aligning them in symbolic practice.

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Why this matters

The materialism–idealism debate survives only by imagining that reality must be founded on one privileged substrate. But if being is meaning, there is no substrate beneath construal. There are only the symbolic orientations we adopt in construing reality.

Material and ideal are not ultimate categories; they are phases of reflexive construal within the same ontological field.

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The pay-off

Materialism mistakes construal of persistence for the ground of being.

Idealism mistakes construal of reflexivity for the ground of being.

Both are ontological fallacies: they reify a symbolic orientation as a metaphysical base.

In a universe where being is meaning, there is no need to choose between matter and mind. Reality is neither substance nor spirit, but the reflexive unfolding of construal — which can be oriented materially, ideally, or otherwise, without requiring a substrate beneath.

Being is Meaning: Empiricism vs Rationalism

For centuries, philosophers have sparred over the foundations of knowledge. Empiricism claims that knowledge begins in sense experience, the data delivered by the world. Rationalism replies that knowledge arises from reason itself, from principles independent of the senses.

The two sides disagree sharply — yet both presuppose the same divide between what is and how it is known.

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The old divide

Empiricism roots knowledge in the immediacy of perception. Rationalism roots knowledge in the necessity of reason. One leans outward toward the world, the other inward toward the mind.

The struggle depends on imagining two separate sources: “raw data” of experience on the one hand, “pure logic” on the other. But can either ever be found apart from meaning?

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The relational shift

If being is meaning, then both “raw sense data” and “pure reason” are illusions.

• There is no uninterpreted sensory input: perception is already construed as meaningful.

• There is no reason operating outside construal: rational inference is itself a mode of meaning, reflexively aligning phenomena.

A relational ontology reframes the debate:

• Ontology = the systemic potential of meaning-being, in which perception and reason are not separate sources but complementary modalities.

• Epistemology = the reflexive construal that phases between phenomenal immediacy (experience) and metaphenomenal alignment (reasoning).

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Why this matters

The empiricism–rationalism debate survives only so long as we imagine a split between the world’s givenness and the mind’s activity. Once we recognise that phenomena are always already construed, and that reason is itself a symbolic construal, the opposition evaporates.

Both experience and reason are phases of the same process: the unfolding of meaning-being.

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The pay-off

Empiricism misleads by positing data before meaning; rationalism misleads by positing reason beyond meaning. Both replicate the ontology/epistemology divide in miniature.

In a universe where being is meaning, knowledge is neither extracted from sensory givens nor deduced from abstract principles. It is the reflexive movement of construal itself, phasing between immediacy and abstraction, phenomena and metaphenomena.

Being is Meaning: Realism vs Constructivism

Few debates in philosophy are more entrenched than realism vs constructivism. On one side, realists insist that reality exists independently of human perception or interpretation. On the other, constructivists argue that reality is a human or social construction, shaped by our categories, practices, and discourses.

Both sides appear to offer radically different visions. Yet both presuppose the same hidden assumption: that there is a fundamental gap between what is and how it is known.

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The old divide

Realism claims that knowledge corresponds to reality “as it is,” while constructivism counters that knowledge is fabricated by us, with no access to things in themselves. The argument turns endlessly: either we affirm an independent world, or we dissolve the world into our constructions.

This tug-of-war only makes sense if we believe that being and knowing belong to different orders.

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The relational shift

If being is meaning, the opposition collapses. There is no “mute real” standing apart from meaning, and no arbitrary “construction” spinning reality out of thin air.

• Realism errs by positing a reality behind or beneath meaning.

• Constructivism errs by treating meaning as free invention, unmoored from any structured potential.

A relational ontology reframes the question:

• Ontology identifies reality as structured potential for construal. Being is always already meaningful.

• Epistemology attends to how construals are actualised and aligned within that potential. Knowing is the reflexive unfolding of meaning-being.

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Why this matters

Once the ground shifts, the old opposition reveals itself as a false dilemma. The choice was never between “a reality beyond meaning” and “a world arbitrarily constructed.” Reality is meaning-being: neither external to construal, nor reducible to whim.

Realism and constructivism both mistake their corner of the map for the whole terrain. One clings to a substrate, the other to sheer invention. Both miss the reflexive alignment of construal that makes reality what it is.

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The pay-off

With this reframing, we can diagnose the limits of both positions. Realism presupposes an unconstrued real; constructivism presupposes a constructor standing apart from the world. Both are residues of the ontology/epistemology split.

In a universe where being is meaning, there is no need to choose. Reality is neither “out there” waiting to be copied, nor “in here” waiting to be fabricated. It is the reflexive unfolding of construal, phase by phase, across beings and collectives.

Being is Meaning: Ontology vs Epistemology

Philosophy has long staged its dramas on the divide between ontology and epistemology. Ontology, we are told, asks what exists; epistemology, how we know it. Being on one side, knowledge on the other.

But what if this framing is already misleading? What if being is nothing other than meaning?

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The old divide

In the traditional picture, being is presumed mute and inert — a reality “out there” independent of any interpretation. Knowledge, in turn, is our fragile attempt to bridge the gap: to represent what is, more or less accurately.

This schema generates its familiar oppositions: realism vs constructivism, empiricism vs rationalism, objectivity vs subjectivity. Each debate turns on the same assumption: that there is a fundamental split between what is and how it is known.

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The relational shift

In a relational ontology, there is no such gap. To be is already to mean. Reality is not mute substance but structured potential for construal. There is no “being” prior to meaning, and no “knowing” apart from the ways beings construe.

This requires a shift in the way we draw the ontology/epistemology distinction:

• Ontology becomes the theory of meaning-being itself: the systemic potential for construal, the conditions under which meaning is possible. Ontology asks: what does it mean to mean?

• Epistemology becomes the theory of construal: the reflexive work of actualising, stabilising, and aligning meaning. Epistemology asks: how do beings construe meaning?

In other words:

• Ontology = system + phenomenon (the potential of meaning and its first-order actualisation).

• Epistemology = instance + metaphenomenon (the perspectival cut of construal, and the reflexive construal of construal).

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Why this matters

Once ontology and epistemology are reframed this way, the old dualisms begin to dissolve. We no longer imagine an unknowable “real” behind appearances, nor a detached “knowing subject” standing over against it. Instead, we see a continuous field of construal: phenomena, construals of phenomena, reflexive construals of construal.

Ontology and epistemology remain distinct — but only as phases within meaning-being, not as separate domains.

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The pay-off

This reframing clears the ground for a new critique. When someone insists on a reality “beyond” meaning, or on a knowledge “outside” construal, we can diagnose the fallacy: they are projecting the old divide back into a world that has never been divided.

In a universe where being is meaning, ontology and epistemology no longer compete across a gulf. They are complementary perspectives on the same reflexive process: the unfolding of construal in the very fabric of reality.

Systemic Functional Neuroscience: Relational Research Agenda

Goal: To operationalise SFN as a transdisciplinary, multi-stratal, relational science of meaning, integrating neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata while accommodating collective construals.

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1. Mapping Neural Meaning Potential

Objective: Identify instantial systems and patterns of semiotic potential in the brain.

Approach:

• Use multi-site, high-density neural recordings (cortex, thalamus, limbic system) not as causal traces, but as snapshots of instantiated potential.

• Analyse co-activation patterns as relational networks of neural options.

• Track variability across contexts to model potential spaces rather than fixed circuits.

Relational Note: Neural ensembles are substrates of meaning, not generators; recorded patterns are perspectival instantiations, not outputs.

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2. Semiotic-Neural Modelling

Objective: Translate neural data into meaning structures.

Approach:

• Apply Field–Tenor–Mode (FTM) analysis:

  • Field: What type of experience or phenomenon is being construed?

  • Tenor: What relational stance, affective orientation, or social positioning is enacted?

  • Mode: How is the experience structured temporally and thematically?

• Model neural ensembles as clauses of meaning, mapping how metafunctions (ideational, interpersonal, textual) are realised in neural dynamics.

Relational Note: This method captures cross-stratal instantiations, linking neural activity to phenomenological and symbolic experience.

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3. Reconfiguring Experimental Design

Objective: Shift from stimulus-response paradigms to semiotic instantiation elicitation.

Approach:

• Design tasks that require active meaning-making, e.g.:

  • Narrative generation (spoken or written)

  • Gesture-based enactments

  • Collaborative decision-making or problem-solving

• Include socially distributed tasks to observe collective construal.

• Measure not just behaviour or neural signals, but how participants instantiate semiotic potential.

Relational Note: Participants are enactors of meaning, with each trial being a perspectival cut from their potential networks.

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4. Triangulating Across Strata

Objective: Connect neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata for coherent multi-level analysis.

Approach:

• Combine:

  • Neural recordings (e.g., EEG, fMRI, multi-electrode arrays)

  • Phenomenological reports (introspective, experience sampling)

  • Symbolic outputs (language, gesture, social interaction)

• Analyse cross-stratal coherence and inter-stratal influence.

• Include metasemiotic reflection, i.e., participants’ reports on their own construals, to capture second-order meaning.

Relational Note: Strata co-actualise in instantiation; triangulation allows mapping of multi-stratal semiotic patterns.

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5. Modelling Collective Construals

Objective: Capture shared semiotic potential and relational alignment in groups.

Approach:

• Observe multi-agent tasks, communication, and co-construction of meaning.

• Model alignment vectors: how individual potentials converge to form collective instantiations.

• Analyse interpersonal resonance, collective memory, and distributed attention patterns.

Relational Note: Collective construals are higher-order instantiations that modulate individual potentials and create emergent coherence.

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6. Analytical Principles

• Treat neural data as ensembles of semiotic options, not as deterministic codes.

• Focus on variation and selection across potential spaces, capturing the dynamics of instantiation.

• Emphasise perspectival cuts: every measurement or observation is itself an instantiation.

• Map metafunctional balance (ideational, interpersonal, textual) across strata and collective scales.

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7. Methodological Ethics

• Respect participants as co-constructors of meaning, not experimental objects.

• Incorporate reflexivity: researchers’ interpretations are part of the semiotic ecology.

• Maintain openness to emergent patterns, avoiding reduction to linear causality.

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8. Vision for SFN Research

• Generate multi-stratal, relational atlases of meaning potential in individuals and collectives.

• Develop neural–semiotic computational models of instantiation dynamics.

• Produce experimental paradigms that foreground meaning-making, relationality, and social alignment.

• Move beyond reductionist neuroscience toward a transdisciplinary, relational understanding of consciousness.

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This research agenda directly operationalises the relational SFN manifesto, giving concrete guidance for experiments, data interpretation, and collective analysis.

Systemic Functional Neuroscience: A Relational Manifesto

Towards a Relational Semiotic Theory of Brain, Consciousness, and Meaning

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Abstract

Systemic Functional Neuroscience (SFN) reconceives the brain not as a computational device or mechanism producing consciousness, but as a substrate for the relational instantiation of semiotic potential. Integrating Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) with Edelman’s Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS), and framed within a relational ontology, SFN treats consciousness, perception, attention, and memory as perspectival cuts from networks of neural and symbolic potential. This manifesto outlines the foundational principles, theoretical commitments, and research agenda of SFN as a transdisciplinary, multi-stratal, relational science of meaning.

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1. Introduction: Meaning as Relational Potential

Traditional neuroscience assumes the brain processes inputs, stores representations, and produces outputs. SFN begins elsewhere: meaning is primary. It is not produced by the brain but organises its activity, shaping perception, attention, memory, and consciousness as instantiated potentials across neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata.

Each conscious moment is a perspectival cut, a structured instantiation drawn from evolving networks of neural and social meaning potential. Consciousness is thus not a thing, property, or output, but an event in relational space.

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2. Foundational Commitments

2.1 Meaning as Primary

• The brain is a semiotic substrate, not a container or generator of meaning.

• Semiotic potential is constitutive of experience: neural activity, phenomenology, and symbolic expression co-actualise in each instantiation.

2.2 System as Potential

• Neural networks form instantial systems, relational networks of options.

• Each instantiation is a cut from potential, actualising some possibilities while leaving others latent.

• Meaning resides in relations among potentials, not in the elements themselves.

2.3 Stratal Ecology

• Meaning is realised across co-instantiating strata:

  1. Neural: dynamic ensembles of neuronal groups.

  2. Phenomenological: experiential instantiation (perception, affect, volition).

  3. Symbolic: semiotic structures (language, gesture, culture).

• Strata are mutually constraining, each instantiation a cross-stratal event.

2.4 Metafunctional Axes

• Neural instantiations navigate intrinsic axes of meaning:

  • Ideational: construing experience.

  • Interpersonal: enacting relational stance and affect.

  • Textual: structuring flow, coherence, and attention.

• Metafunctions are organising principles of meaning, realised relationally, not externally imposed.

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3. Reframing Core Concepts

3.1 Consciousness

• A process of relational instantiation, not a state.

• Each act of consciousness is a neural text, structured, thematically organised, and metafunctionally balanced.

• Consciousness is a perspectival cut across neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata.

3.2 Perception

• Active construal of experience, not passive reception.

• Neural structures organise potentials into coherent perceptual patterns (Theme–Rheme, Given–New).

• Perception is relational: a manifestation of semiotic potential, not encoding an objective reality.

3.3 Attention

• A relational mechanism foregrounding selected potentials in instantiation.

• It shapes coherence, flow, and thematic prominence across strata.

• Attention is a vector of alignment, not a spotlight.

3.4 Memory

• Activation of prior instantiations, forming intertextual resonance.

• Memory shapes subsequent instantiations by influencing which potentials are foregrounded.

• It is relational and perspectival, not storage.

3.5 Collective Construal

• Semiotic potential is distributed across agents.

• Multiple participants co-actualise shared potential, producing higher-order coherence.

• Collective instantiations mediate individual and social semiotic dynamics.

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4. Methodological Framework

4.1 Mapping Instantial Systems

• Identify dynamic neural ensembles as networks of potential, not static circuits.

• Recordings capture snapshots of instantiated relations, not linear cause–effect chains.

4.2 Semiotic-Neural Modelling

• Adapt Field–Tenor–Mode (FTM) to neural instantiations:

  • Field: experience being construed.

  • Tenor: relational stance enacted.

  • Mode: temporal organisation of the instantiation.

• Each brain state becomes a meaning clause, not a data point.

4.3 Reconfiguring Experiments

• Participants are enactors of meaning, not passive responders.

• Tasks elicit semiotic instantiations, e.g., through language, gesture, or collaborative construction.

4.4 Triangulating Across Strata

• Combine neural, phenomenological, and symbolic data.

• Include participant metasemiotic reflection as data on construals of their own meaning-making.

• Enables cross-stratal coherence analysis.

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5. Toward a Relational Science of Meaning

SFN unites neuroscience, linguistics, phenomenology, and systems theory in a multi-stratal relational ecology.

• The brain is a semiotic infrastructure, not the source of consciousness.

• Meaning is made and enacted, not stored or decoded.

• Collective and individual instantiations interact to create coherent patterns of experience and symbolic expression.

Just as linguistics shifted from rule-based grammar to social semiotics, neuroscience must move from computation and storage metaphors to neuronal semiosis and relational instantiation.

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6. Conclusion: A Call to Relational Instantiation

SFN is a theory of how meaning is enacted, individually and collectively, across neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata.

Understanding the brain is not about decoding it. It is about reading instantiations of semiotic potential, as events in a relational ecology of meaning.

“Meaning is not what the brain makes. Meaning is what the brain is for.”

Systemic Functional Neuroscience (SFN) — Relationally Reframed

Systemic Functional Neuroscience (SFN) is a radical, relational paradigm for understanding consciousness, perception, and neural dynamics. It aligns Halliday’s systemic functional theory of meaning with Edelman’s neural theory of value, embedding both in a relational ontology where meaning is primary, systems are potentials, and instantiation is perspectival.

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1. Foundational Principles of SFN

1.1 Meaning as Primary

• The brain is not a container of meaning; it is a substrate for the enactment of semiotic potentials.

• Meaning is the organising principle of neural activity. Neural patterns only acquire significance as instantiations of semiotic potentials across strata.

1.2 System as Potential

• Neural groups form instantial systems, networks of potential activations, not fixed circuits.

• Each neural instantiation represents a perspectival cut from the system’s potential, realising some possibilities while excluding others.

• Systems are relational: meaning resides in the structure of options and constraints, not in individual neural elements.

1.3 Stratal Ecology

• Meaning unfolds across multiple interdependent strata:

  1. Neural stratum: material substrate, dynamic ensembles of activation.

  2. Phenomenological stratum: experience, the felt aspect of instantiation.

  3. Symbolic stratum: semiotic patterns and communicable meaning.

• Each act of consciousness is a coherent cut across strata, simultaneously neural, experiential, and symbolic.

1.4 Metafunctional Organisation of Meaning

• Neural instantiations are organised along inherent axes:

  • Ideational: construing experience, generating predictions, shaping perception.

  • Interpersonal: enacting affective and motivational stances, relational positioning.

  • Textual: structuring flow, attention, salience, and coherence.

• These metafunctions are intrinsic to meaning-making, not imposed categories.

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2. Reconceiving Core Concepts

2.1 Consciousness

• Consciousness is not a thing or property, but a process of instantiation.

• Each act is a neural text: a coherent, thematically organised, and metafunctionally balanced event.

• It is a perspectival cut, actualising a subset of potential meaning across the neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata.

2.2 Perception

• Perception is active construal, not passive reception.

• Neural structures (e.g., thalamus) function as organising hubs, coordinating potentials into coherent perceptual clauses (Theme–Rheme; Given–New).

• Perception is relational: the brain enacts patterns of potential meaning, rather than encoding an objective “input.”

2.3 Attention

• Attention is a textual and relational mechanism.

• It foregrounds certain potentials in instantiation, managing flow, prominence, and cohesion across strata.

• It is not a spotlight but a vector of perspectival alignment, shaping which meanings are actualised.

2.4 Memory

• Memory is activation of prior instantiations, not storage of static information.

• It functions as intertextual resonance, enabling coherence between present and past cuts.

• Memory shapes neural potential by influencing which possibilities are foregrounded in subsequent instantiations.

2.5 Collective Construal

• SFN is extensible to socially distributed meaning-making.

• Multiple agents co-actualise shared potentials, generating collective instantiations of meaning across neural and symbolic strata.

• Collective construals create higher-order coherence, mediating individual and social semiotic dynamics.

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3. Methodological Framework

3.1 Mapping Instantial Systems

• Neural ensembles are mapped as dynamic networks of potential, not static circuits.

• Multi-site recordings reveal snapshots of instantiated relations, showing which potentials are actualised in context.

3.2 Semiotic Modelling of Neural Dynamics

• Neural instantiations are modelled using Field–Tenor–Mode (FTM), adapted from SFL:

  • Field: What experience is being construed?

  • Tenor: What relational stance or affect is enacted?

  • Mode: How is the experience temporally organised?

• Each brain state is thus a meaning clause, not a data point.

3.3 Reconfiguring Experiments

• Participants are enactors of meaning, not passive responders.

• Tasks elicit semiotic instantiations through language, gesture, decision-making, or collaborative construction.

3.4 Integrating Metasemiotic Reflection

• Participants’ self-reports are treated as metasemiotic data, reflecting construal of their own instantiations.

• This provides triangulation across neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata, linking first-person and third-person perspectives.

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4. SFN as a Relational Neurosemiotic Ecology

• SFN bridges phenomenology (Varela), neuroscience (Edelman, Damasio), and linguistics (Halliday) within a relational ontology of potential.

• The brain is a semiotic substrate, not the source of consciousness.

• Meaning is made, enacted, and aligned, not stored or decoded.

• Collective and individual instantiations interact in a multi-stratal ecology, generating coherent patterns of experience and symbolic expression.

Summary Statement:

In relationally reframed SFN, consciousness, perception, attention, and memory are not entities or processes within the brain; they are perspectival instantiations of potential meaning, dynamically realised across neural, phenomenological, and symbolic strata, individually and collectively. The brain provides the semiotic infrastructure, but the act of meaning-making is relational, multi-stratal, and emergent in each instantiation.