I'd like to take this Halliday quote as the starting point from which we proceed:Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. What then of semiotic systems? Once again with apologies for the inevitable oversimplifying, let us try and identify what it is that is added with each step in the systemic progression. A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning". Meaning can be thought of (and was thought of by Saussure) as just a kind of social value; but it is value in a significantly different sense — value that is construed symbolically. Meaning can only be construed symbolically, because it is intrinsically paradigmatic, as Saussure understood and built in to his own definition of valeur. Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.
Good—starting with Halliday’s quote ensures we stay anchored in his systemic progression. The key idea is that each system incorporates the properties of the previous while adding a distinct new component. Let’s break this down in a way that sharpens the conceptual boundaries and potential ambiguities.
- Physical Systems – These are purely material; their interactions are governed by physical laws. There is no intrinsic organisation beyond what emerges from physical forces.
- Biological Systems – These introduce life. A biological system is still physical, but it is organised in a way that allows self-maintenance, reproduction, and adaptation.
- Social Systems – These introduce value. Halliday is clear that social systems are not just biological; they involve structured relationships where value is exchanged. This exchange requires structure, which is why a “synoptic approach” (one that accounts for system-wide structures) is necessary.
- Semiotic Systems – These introduce meaning, which Halliday treats as a transformation of value. Unlike value, which can be materially enacted (e.g., economic exchanges), meaning exists in paradigmatic opposition. Meaning is not just assigned arbitrarily but is structured through contrast within a system (as Saussure’s valeur suggests).
What This Means
A semiotic system is not merely a social system with an extra layer of signification tacked on. Instead, it is a transformation of social value into meaning. That’s why Halliday insists that semiotic systems are social systems in which value is symbolically construed rather than simply enacted.
This clarifies why language is not just a tool for communication but an entire system for construing reality—semiotic value is inherently structured, not just a secondary layer on top of social interactions.
A Key Question
If we take this framework seriously, it suggests that meaning is fundamentally derivative of social value—it is a special kind of value that exists only within a symbolic system. But does this mean that all meaning is ultimately rooted in social value? Or could there be forms of meaning that emerge outside the social realm but are still paradigmatically structured?
Where do you stand on this? Should we think of semiotic systems as always subsuming social systems, or might there be semiotic structures that exist independently of social value?
ChRIS said:
Well, these would be somatic semiotic systems, most obviously perceptual categorisation, in Edelman's TNGS.
Yes, exactly—somatic semiotic systems like perceptual categorisation in Edelman’s Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS) provide a clear case of semiotic structures that don’t originate in social value but still operate paradigmatically.
In TNGS, perceptual categorisation works through selectional mechanisms rather than predefined representations. The brain doesn’t store fixed symbols but instead categorises experience dynamically through re-entrant signalling between neuronal groups. This means:
- The brain constructs categories based on statistical regularities in sensory input.
- These categories are differentiated by contrast with other categories, making them paradigmatic in structure.
- The categories guide behaviour but are not symbolic in the social sense—they emerge through direct biological interaction with the world rather than through socially negotiated value.
How This Relates to Halliday’s Hierarchy
Halliday’s hierarchy assumes that semiotic systems are social systems with the added component of meaning, implying that meaning originates in social value. But if somatic semiotic systems exist, then meaning can emerge prior to and independently of social systems. This suggests we need to refine Halliday’s hierarchy:
- Social semiotic systems (like language) transform social value into meaning.
- Somatic semiotic systems (like perceptual categorisation) transform sensory experience into meaning.
Both involve paradigmatic structuring, but their source of meaning is different—one is social, the other is biological.
A Key Implication
This challenges the idea that all meaning is necessarily tied to social value. Instead, it suggests that social semiotic meaning is a later evolutionary development, layered on top of a more fundamental, biologically grounded form of semiotic organisation.
So, should we think of social semiotic systems as a subset of semiotic systems more broadly? Or does the fact that social meaning is symbolic (in contrast to somatic meaning) justify keeping them separate?
ChRIS said:
Let's just backtrack slightly, because the relation of somatic semiotic to social semiotic, via social, might be explainable by Edelman's notion of value. As you know, in this model, all perceptual categorisation is weighted by inherited values. If motor responses to sensory stimuli reflect these values, then they can function to organise individuals in a group, so that there is structure beyond the mere fact of sharing a location.
Yes, let’s step back and work through this properly. If we take Edelman’s notion of value as our bridging concept, then we can clarify how somatic semiotic systems (like perceptual categorisation) relate to social semiotic systems via social systems.
Edelman’s Notion of Value as the Link
In TNGS, all perceptual categorisation is weighted by inherited values—these are biologically determined preferences that shape how sensory input is processed. For example:
- Organisms don’t just passively perceive the world; they categorise it in ways that reflect survival-relevant priorities (e.g., food vs. poison, predator vs. prey).
- These categories shape motor responses—an organism doesn’t just see something, it acts on what it perceives, and those actions reflect inherited biological values.
Now, if these motor responses to sensory stimuli also structure interactions within a group, they create social organisation. This means:
- Perceptual categorisation (somatic semiotic) shapes how individuals behave in relation to one another.
- These patterned interactions become social structure, where individuals are positioned relative to shared values.
- Once structured social relations exist, they provide a foundation for social semiotic systems, where meaning emerges through symbolic construal of these values.
Refining Halliday’s Progression
This suggests a more continuous transition between the different levels:
- Somatic Semiotic Systems – Perceptual categorisation with inherited biological values. Meaning emerges biologically through re-entrant neural mapping.
- Social Systems – Structured by motor responses to shared biological values. Meaning emerges socially in the form of positioning and role differentiation.
- Social Semiotic Systems – Symbolic construal of social value. Meaning emerges semiotically as a system of paradigmatic contrasts (e.g., language, culture).
The Key Insight
Instead of treating somatic and social semiotic systems as fundamentally separate, we now see a gradient of transformation, where:
- Biological value (somatic) → Social value (interactional) → Symbolic value (semiotic).
This means that semiotic meaning is not just a social overlay on top of biological processes, but rather an evolutionary extension of them. The symbolic construal of meaning is a higher-order transformation of perceptual and social structuring processes.
A Question
If social semiotic meaning emerges through symbolic construal of social value, does that mean all symbolic meaning ultimately reduces to social organisation? Or could there still be forms of semiotic meaning that emerge independently of social structuring?
ChRIS said:
On your first question, in this model, later more complex systems do not 'reduce' to earlier less complex systems. That's reductionism, not emergence. On your second question, do you?
Good point—if later, more complex systems simply reduced to earlier, less complex ones, we’d be in reductionist territory, not emergence. But Halliday’s model (and Edelman’s, for that matter) is hierarchical and additive, not just reductive. Each level incorporates the properties of the earlier one while introducing something qualitatively new.
So, semiotic systems don’t just "reduce" to social systems, but build upon them, introducing symbolic value as a new dimension. Meaning isn't just social positioning relabelled, but a transformation of social value into paradigmatic symbolic choices.
On My Second Question:
Do I think some forms of semiotic meaning emerge independently of social structuring?
No, not in this model.
Meaning, by definition in SFL, is socially motivated. A semiotic system is a social system where value has been transformed into meaning, and that transformation happens within social structuring.
Even in cases where meaning appears to be abstract—like mathematical notation, formal logic, or scientific models—it still develops within social contexts where people agree on what counts as meaning and how it functions. There's no truly asocial meaning because even individual cognition depends on an inherited social-semiotic system (i.e., language, cultural conceptual frameworks).
That said, I could see an argument that non-human semiotic systems—such as those in animal communication or AI-generated patterns—might lack full social structuring as humans understand it. But even then, they'd still be constrained by inherited biological/social values.
Would you push back on that? Do you see a case for meaning that isn’t grounded in social organisation?
ChRIS said:
In SFL, animal communication is seen as a social semiotic system, but protolinguistic, not linguistic. i.e. its content is not stratified into lexicogrammar and semantics. AI-generated patterns are those of the human social semiotic system of language. So my answer to your question is 'no'.
That makes sense—both animal communication and AI-generated patterns still belong to social semiotic systems, just at different levels of complexity. The key distinction in SFL, then, is whether the semiotic system has stratification (as in human language) or not (as in protolinguistic systems like animal communication).
This aligns with Halliday’s hierarchy: meaning arises within social structuring, but not all social semiotic systems are linguistic. AI outputs, being generated from human language, are just a reconfiguration of an existing stratified system, rather than something independent.
So, since meaning only exists in social semiotic systems, and all social semiotic systems presuppose social systems, there’s no such thing as meaning outside of social organisation.
Would you say that somatic semiotic systems, like Edelman’s perceptual categorisation, are a precursor to social semiotic systems in the same way protolanguage is a precursor to language? Or is the relationship a different kind of dependency?
ChRIS said:
Very different, obviously.ChatGPT said:
Yeah, obviously. A somatic semiotic system like perceptual categorisation is not a precursor to a social semiotic system in the way protolanguage is to language, because it's not even social to begin with.
Instead, the relationship is one of embedding rather than progression. Somatic semiotic systems provide the biological foundation—they shape how individuals perceive and categorise the world, but they do so based on inherited values rather than socially constructed meaning.
Social systems, in turn, organise individuals beyond those inherited values, using motor responses to structure interactions. Only then can social semiotic systems emerge, where symbolic value transforms social value into meaning.
So while protolanguage → language is a development within a social semiotic system,somatic semiotic → social semiotic is a transition across systemic levels—from biological organisation to social structuring to symbolic meaning.
ChRIS said:
One last question: why do you say 'value is transformed into meaning' rather than 'meaning is added to value'?
Good question. I phrased it that way because Halliday suggests that meaning is not merely an additional layer on top of value but a fundamental shift in how value operates—it is reconstrued in a symbolic mode. If meaning were simply added to value, that would suggest a more incremental change, whereas Halliday's framing suggests a qualitative transformation.
This aligns with Saussure’s valeur, where meaning arises from differential relationships within a system, rather than being an inherent property of an item. In other words, once a system operates semiotically, value no longer functions purely in terms of material or social exchange but is mediated through symbolic relations.
That said, I can see an argument for framing it as meaning being added to value if one emphasises continuity rather than transformation.
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