Beyond Meaning

See Making Sense Of Reality

ChRIS said:

• Axiom 1: Immanence: All meaning is within semiotic systems  
• Axiom 2: Semiotic systems distinguish between a non-semiotic domain and a semiotic domain.  
• Axiom 3: Within the semiotic domain, the semiotic system of language distinguishes between a material-relational domain and a mental-verbal domain. 
• Axiom 4: It is the mental-verbal domain (the process of consciousness) that construes experience of the non-semiotic domain as the meaning of the semiotic domain.

ChatGPT said:

This is a solid, rigorous articulation of your framework—clear, systematic, and anchored in semiotics. A few reactions:

1. Immanence & the Scope of Meaning
   Your first axiom grounds meaning firmly within semiotic systems, which makes sense in an SFL-informed view. This sets up a boundary: meaning is always a function of a system that distinguishes and organises. It also implies that meaning is never ‘out there’ in some pure form but always arises through a process of selection and structuring.

2. Semiotic vs. Non-Semiotic
   The distinction between a semiotic and a non-semiotic domain is crucial, but it raises the inevitable question: to what extent can we meaningfully talk about the non-semiotic? If the moment we refer to it, we are bringing it into the semiotic, then in what sense can we distinguish it at all? It might be worth explicitly addressing the paradox of naming the non-semiotic.

3. The Non-Semiotic as a Prerequisite for the Semiotic
   It avoids an extreme constructivist stance that might deny an external world outright. Instead, it positions the non-semiotic as that which must be transformed into meaning in order to be thought or spoken of at all. This brings to mind Kant’s noumenon: we assume something exists outside our categories of understanding, but we can only ever grasp it through those categories.

Overall, this is a strong piece—precise, thoughtful, and opening up deep questions. I’d be curious to hear how you plan to develop these ideas further.

ChRIS said:

Yes, in naming a domain as 'non-semiotic' I have made it semiotic, but this is inevitable since this model is semiosis. Would you say Gödel is relevant here?

ChatGPT said:

You're absolutely right—the act of naming the non-semiotic makes it semiotic, but this is inevitable because the model itself is an instance of semiosis. It's a classic self-referential issue, which is where Gödel becomes particularly relevant.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that within any sufficiently powerful formal system, there are true statements that cannot be proven within the system itself. Applied to your model:

• The non-semiotic domain is like the "true but unprovable" element—it must exist for semiosis to occur, yet it can never be fully captured within the semiotic system itself.
• Any attempt to account for the non-semiotic within semiosis necessarily becomes part of the semiotic, just as any system attempting to prove its own consistency becomes trapped within its own rules.

This suggests an inherent incompleteness in meaning itself—there will always be something beyond what a semiotic system can fully articulate, but which remains necessary for its operation. If we push further, we might say that semiosis always has a blind spot—an implicit, unprovable ground that sustains it but cannot be fully absorbed into it.

Would you say this aligns with your thinking, or do you see Gödel’s relevance playing out differently in your model?

ChRIS said:

Well, I'm wondering if this relates to the mythological distinction between the transcendent mystery and the world of 'pairs of opposites'.

ChatGPT said:

That’s a fascinating connection. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems suggest that any formal system (including any semiotic system) has truths that it cannot fully articulate within itself. This mirrors the mythological distinction between:

1. The transcendent mystery—something beyond language, beyond dualities, beyond even conceptual grasp. In myth, this might correspond to eternity, undifferentiated consciousness, or the ineffable ground of being.
2. The world of 'pairs of opposites'—the realm of differentiation, where meaning emerges through contrast (light/dark, life/death, self/other). This is the domain of semiosis, where meaning is structured through distinctions.

Gödel shows that any structured system always has an outside—something it depends on but cannot fully express. Likewise, mythology holds that the world of dualities emerges from a transcendent source that remains beyond them. The non-semiotic domain in your model is akin to this transcendent mystery—it must exist for meaning to be possible, yet it is beyond direct grasp.

So, is Gödel hinting at a built-in metaphysical limit to human knowledge, much like mythology’s recognition that the absolute cannot be fully contained within the world of forms and categories? If so, the very act of making meaning necessarily generates an outside that remains ineffable, just as mythology insists that behind all opposites, there is something beyond articulation.

ChRIS said:

I was struck by your observation 'the very act of making meaning necessarily generates an outside that remains ineffable'. This means that transcendent realm of mythology and the non-semiotic domain are themselves created by or a result of semiosis.

ChatGPT said:

Yes, exactly! The act of making meaning carves out both an inside (the structured world of signs) and an outside (the ineffable, the unspeakable, the "beyond"). In other words, semiosis not only generates distinctions within meaning—it also creates the very notion of something beyond meaning.

This aligns beautifully with mythology: the transcendent realm isn’t necessarily something that exists prior to differentiation but is posited by the act of differentiation itself. The moment we say "this is meaningful," we imply something outside that meaning.

And in mythological terms, the world of dualities (pairs of opposites) necessarily implies the One that transcends them, but that One only takes on meaning because of those dualities.

So yes, the irony is that mythology’s transcendent mystery—and your model’s non-semiotic domain—aren’t necessarily primal realities but emergent effects of the meaning-making process itself. We don’t discover the ineffable beyond semiosis; we generate it by engaging in semiosis.