Modern philosophy has often treated this split as fundamental — whether by centring the subject (as in Descartes), or by centering the object (as in scientific realism). But what if the split itself is not primitive?
The old divide
Subject: the active centre of awareness, consciousness, or agency.
Object: the passive thing encountered, extended in space and time.
Knowledge is cast as a relation between these two poles: the subject represents, the object resists. The result is an endless struggle — how can the mind grasp the world, and how can the world be more than our projection?
The relational shift
If being is meaning, then both subject and object are cuts within the same field of construal.
The subject is a construal of perspective, the locus of “for-whom” meaning unfolds.
The object is a construal of orientation, the locus of “what” is meant.
Neither is primordial. Both are perspectival effects, phase-shifts within the reflexive unfolding of meaning-being.
So:
Ontology = the systemic potential for such perspectival construals.
Epistemology = the actual phasing of construal into subject-orientations and object-orientations.
Why this matters
The subject/object distinction feels absolute only if we think of being as split from knowing. But once being is understood as meaning, subject and object are no longer ontological primitives — they are roles generated within construal itself.
This dissolves the old epistemological anxiety: we do not need to explain how subjects can access objects across a gulf, because no gulf exists. The two emerge together as complementary orientations of the same process.
The pay-off
Subject–object dualism mistakes perspectival construal for an ontological structure.
Realist objectivism absolutises the object.
Subjectivist idealism absolutises the subject.
Both freeze one pole of a dynamic relation and reify it as the ground of reality.
In a universe where being is meaning, subject and object are not fundamental kinds but reflexive cuts. They are how construal phases, not what reality is.
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