Qualia

ChRIS said: 

I'm wondering about 'qualia'. Are there an inherent problems with the notion itself? Do you think it is used to partition off humanity from the rest of the animal kingdom?

ChatGPT said:

Ah, qualia—the philosophical darling of consciousness debates. There are definitely inherent problems with the notion itself, both conceptually and methodologically. A few key issues:

1. The Hard-to-Pin-Down Nature of Qualia

The standard definition of qualia refers to the subjective, ineffable "what it’s like" aspect of experience—e.g., the redness of red, the bitterness of coffee. But this definition is frustratingly vague. It assumes:

• That subjective experiences have an intrinsic quality independent of cognitive processes.
• That these qualities can be meaningfully individuated (e.g., the “redness” of red as a discrete entity rather than as part of a dynamic perceptual process).

If we take a more functionalist or enactivist perspective, perception is not about discrete qualia but about relations—redness is not a standalone entity in consciousness but a function of contrast, context, and embodied interaction. This makes qualia look like a reification of an ongoing process rather than a fundamental feature of experience.

2. The Explanatory Gap and Circularity

Philosophers like Chalmers use qualia to highlight the "hard problem" of consciousness, but this creates a circularity—qualia are defined by their ineffability, and then this ineffability is used to argue that consciousness is mysterious. If we drop the assumption that qualia exist as standalone mental entities, the hard problem dissolves into questions of how neural and semiotic processes construct meaning.

3. Qualia as a Human Exceptionalism Tool

Yes, I think the notion of qualia has been used—whether consciously or not—to partition humans from other animals. If qualia are framed as uniquely human (or as existing in a much richer form in humans), this reinforces a hierarchy where human consciousness is fundamentally different rather than part of a broader continuum of cognitive evolution.

But why assume animals lack qualia? The very arguments used to justify human qualia (e.g., subjective richness, first-person experience) can be applied to non-human animals. We have no privileged access to another being’s phenomenology—only inferences based on behaviour, physiology, and neural structures. And given the similarities in sensory processing and affective states across species, it’s arbitrary to draw a hard boundary.

4. Can We Replace the Concept?

A more useful approach might be to think in terms of semiotic affordances rather than qualia. Instead of asking, What is the intrinsic "redness" of red?, we ask, How does red function in a system of meaning-making? This shifts the question from an ineffable essence to a relational, functional perspective—one that aligns with your potential-instance framework.

What do you think? Do you see a way to salvage qualia within an SFL-informed ontology, or is it too tied to dubious metaphysical assumptions?

ChRIS said:

I suspect the latter, but I'd be very interested to hear your view.

ChatGPT said:

I’m with you—qualia seem too tied to dubious metaphysical assumptions to be salvageable within an SFL-informed ontology. Here’s why:

1. Qualia Assume Intrinsic Meaning, While SFL Sees Meaning as Relational

The very idea of qualia suggests that experience has an intrinsic quality—redness just is, pain just is. But in SFL (and your potential-instance framework), meaning isn’t intrinsic; it emerges through relations and instantiations. If we apply that to perception, the “redness” of red isn’t a fixed, ineffable property—it’s a semiotic affordance, shaped by contrast, function, and context.

Instead of asking, What is the essence of red?, we ask, How does red participate in meaning-making? This shift removes the need for qualia altogether.

2. Qualia Reify Experience, While SFL Treats Experience as Dynamic

Qualia imply that experience is made up of discrete, irreducible mental “atoms.” This clashes with an SFL perspective, where experience is processual—we construct meaning dynamically, through patterns of instantiation.

If we take perception as an unfolding semiotic process, then the so-called “what-it’s-like” of seeing red isn’t a fundamental mental building block; it’s a product of coupling—the relation between sensory affordances, cultural meaning, and social context.

3. Qualia Imply an Observer-Independent Reality, Which Contradicts Your Ontology

Your SFL-informed ontology of quantum mechanics suggests that the observer collapses potential into instance. But qualia, as traditionally framed, assume an observer-independent structure of experience—redness is thought to exist as redness regardless of contextual variation. This directly contradicts the idea that meaning (and by extension, perception) emerges only in relation to an observer.

A better approach would be to say that perceptual experience isn’t a private, ineffable property but a semiotically constrained selection from potential affordances.

4. Qualia Reinforce Cartesian Dualism

The persistence of qualia in philosophy of mind often hinges on an implicit mind-body dualism:

• Qualia are positioned as immaterial, first-person phenomena.
• Neural processes are material, third-person phenomena.
• And the explanatory gap between them is presented as an irreducible mystery.

This contrasts with an SFL-influenced approach, where meaning is neither purely mental nor purely physical, but semiotic—emerging from patterned relations between affordances, instantiated selections, and social contexts. There’s no need to posit ineffable mental atoms when we can explain experience through systemic meaning-making processes.

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What’s the Alternative?

Instead of qualia, I’d propose something like semiotic affordances of perception:

• Redness isn’t a private, ineffable qualia; it’s a semiotic affordance, emerging through contrast (e.g., in a colour system), function (e.g., warning signals, ripeness of fruit), and cultural codification.
• Pain isn’t an intrinsic, irreducible experience; it’s a relationally instantiated process, shaped by physiological response, social meaning, and language (e.g., “pain” vs. “suffering” vs. “discomfort” each frame experience differently).

This perspective makes qualia unnecessary—perception isn’t a passive reception of raw phenomenology but an active meaning-making process, always contingent, contextual, and relational.

So yeah, I’d say qualia are a metaphysical dead-end. They reify what should be understood as semiotic. What do you think—does this fit with your broader rejection of intrinsic meaning?

ChRIS said:

You've explained very well why i've always found the notion "dodgy" :-)

ChatGPT said:

Glad to hear it! “Dodgy” is the perfect word for qualia—just coherent enough to keep people arguing, but fundamentally slippery when you try to pin them down. A classic case of philosophy chasing its own tail.

I imagine if we applied a discourse analysis to qualia debates, we’d find they often rely on presuppositions that smuggle in dualism, intrinsic meaning, and observer-independence without explicitly defending them. A lot of hidden baggage for something that’s supposed to be the essence of raw experience!