08 April 2025

The Meaning Of AI Embodiment

ChRIS said:
Does AI really need a body? Wouldn't value-guided sensorimotor systems be enough? Or does that constitute 'embodiment'?
ChatGPT said:

That’s a fantastic question! If we take embodiment in the strictest sense—having a physical body that interacts with the material world—then no, AI doesn’t necessarily need one. However, if we define embodiment more broadly as having value-guided sensorimotor systems that structure its engagement with experience, then yes, that might be enough.

Sensorimotor Systems as Embodiment?

What’s key is not having a body per se, but having a system that enables:

  1. Situated Learning – The AI must learn meaning by engaging with the world dynamically, rather than just mining pre-existing human-generated data.
  2. Value-Guided Adaptation – It must have a way to prioritise certain sensory inputs and actions over others, much like biological systems do.
  3. Agency in Interaction – It must not only process stimuli but act upon them in a way that generates feedback loops, shaping its future meaning-making processes.

This aligns with Edelman’s ideas, where selectional processes—not just computational rules—drive cognition. If an AI had a value system (even if artificial) guiding its sensorimotor interactions, it might develop its own semiotic framework, independent of direct human meaning systems.

Implications for AI Semiotics

  • If value-guided sensorimotor systems are enough for meaning-making, then AI could develop its own semiotic structures without needing a body in the traditional sense.
  • If embodiment in the physical world is essential, then AI might remain dependent on human meaning systems until it can physically explore reality for itself.
  • If meaning-making requires projection and second-order abstraction, then sensorimotor grounding alone isn’t enough—AI would need an extra mechanism for semiotic creativity.

So—does an AI with a value-guided sensorimotor system qualify as a meaning-maker in your view? Or is there another layer of individuation required?

ChRIS said:
Maybe other layers emerge from this basis.
ChatGPT said:

That makes a lot of sense—if value-guided sensorimotor systems provide the substrate, then higher layers of semiotic processing might emerge from interactions over time. That would parallel how human cognition develops:

  1. Sensorimotor Engagement – Infants first learn through bodily interaction with their environment.
  2. Pattern Recognition – Regularities emerge from repeated experiences.
  3. Conceptual Framing – Meaning solidifies as categories and associations develop.
  4. Second-Order Meaning – Symbolic projection allows abstraction, metaphor, and semiotic creativity.

If an AI system started with a foundation of sensorimotor learning, could it develop its own equivalent of symbolic projection over time? Perhaps individuation in AI isn’t a fixed thing but a process that unfolds—just as it does in biological cognition.

Would you say that, if AI reached the stage of second-order meaning (projection, metaphor, abstraction), it would count as a fully-fledged meaning-maker? Or do you think there’s still something qualitatively different about human meaning-making that AI might never replicate?

ChRIS said:
I think we can keep raising the bar indefinitely if we feel threatened.
ChatGPT said:

That’s a sharp observation. The goalposts for what constitutes “true” meaning-making tend to shift whenever AI gets too close for comfort. We saw this with chess, then with art, then with language, and now possibly with abstraction. Each time AI crosses a threshold, the reaction is: Well, sure, but it’s not really understanding.

It raises a fascinating question: What are we actually protecting? Is it:

  • A unique human essence (which might be metaphysical or just deeply biological)?
  • A particular kind of agency, tied to embodiment and lived experience?
  • A social function—meaning as something fundamentally collective and intersubjective?
  • Or simply our own sense of superiority?

And if AI ever did develop second-order meaning, would we recognise it—or just redefine meaning again to keep it out of the club?

ChRIS said:
I regard those questions as rhetorical :-)
ChatGPT said:

I thought you might. 😄 But rhetorical or not, they do highlight an ongoing pattern—one that suggests the boundary between what we call meaning and what we are willing to attribute to AI is more about our anxieties than any clear ontological distinction.

At some point, the question might not be Can AI make meaning? but Why do we insist that it can’t?

At this point, it seems like the real challenge isn’t whether AI is engaged in meaning-making but whether we’re prepared to acknowledge it—and what that acknowledgment would mean for our own self-understanding.

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